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International Law Advocacy and Its Discontents
DavidJ. Bederman*

Walter Russell Mead has recently observed that there are four fundamental
strands of thought in US foreign policy.' He has given these the provocative labels of
the Jeffersonian, Hamiltonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian schools. At the risk of
simplifying Mead's superbly nuanced characterizations, these thrusts in US foreign
policy reduce to four discrete paradigms: (1) moral and absolutist, emphasizing the
revolutionary values of popular democracy and individual liberty (Jeffersonian); (2)
commercial and pragmatic, accentuating the Republic's business values and need to
release creative energies (Hamiltonian); (3) honor-bound and populist, displaying the
deep-seated and violent cultural values of the American frontier (Jacksonian); and (4)
legalistic and elitist, featuring the cosmopolitan values of foreign engagement and
functional cooperation (Wilsonian).
Obviously, the strength of US foreign policy lies in its ability to draw upon each
of these disparate sources of authority and legitimacy, while also reconciling their
sometimes contradictory policy prescriptions. It would be facile and counter-intuitive
to suggest that one of these ideological strands should have prominence over the
others. We should be, to paraphase Thomas Jefferson's First Inaugural Address,
Jeffersonians, Hamiltonians, Jacksonians, Wilsonians all.
Despite this, our raging domestic culture %vars have now come down to the
shoreline. US foreign policy is again a legitimate target of popular discourse about the
place of values in our governing laws and institutions. Even if we have accepted that
party politics can intrude on foreign affairs (despite protestations to the contrary, this
has often been the case), we have often been less comfortable with the intrusion of
social ideology as a motive force for the development of foreign policy objectives. This
phenomenon can be observed in many facets of US foreign policy-making today.
Indeed, I suggest that it is the central theme of the United States's confrontation with
the complex of phenomena we call globalization.
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But the subject of this essay is much, much narrower: the ideological responses to
the growing use of US courts and judicial processes in the vindication of international
human rights. Professor Curtis Bradleys contribution 2 joins a small, but growing,
body of literature which considers the broader procedural, structural, constitutional,
and foreign policy implications of international human rights litigation in the United
States.' What I will refer to here as the standard critique of international human
rights advocacy is a welcome development, if for no other reason than earlier writings
on this general subject, and particularly on the role of the 1789 Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"),4 have tended to be unfocused and uncritical in their commentary and
undeniably optimistic in their conclusions. I emphasize that my concern here is to
examine the current discontents of international human rights litigation in the US,
particularly civil litigation brought at private instance under the ATS. Significant also
are the wider legal doctrines surrounding suits against entities that qualify for
immunity as foreign sovereigns,' and the prudential grounds that might counsel US
courts from declining to rule on the merits of these cases (including the political
question and act of state doctrines).
Using Professor Bradleys contribution as a point of departure, my essay unfolds
in three steps. The first is to consider some false issues and dichotomies that are often
raised as criticism of private human rights litigation. The rhetorical purpose of these
attacks on ATS litigation is to stereotype human rights advocates and their
supporters as marginal, cosmopolite elitists-at once conniving (in a Wilsonian
manner) and naive (in a Jeffersonian way). The second step in my analysis rebuts a
further discontent of human rights advocacy: that US courts have somehow been
hoodwinked into being the pawns of a shadowy, academic conspiracy to subvert
fundamental US constitutional values of limited government, separation of powers,
and judicial rectitude. My last move in this meditation is to question openly the
Hamiltonian and Jacksonian critique of human rights advocacy and to suggest that,
far from being an elitist, moralist, and legalist phenomenon, ATS litigation may
actually reflect the very best in American foreign policy values.

2.

Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 ChiJ Intl L 457 (2001).

3.

See, for example, David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand:Resbuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S.
Human Rights Litigation, 25 Ga J Intl & Comp Law 255 (1995/1996); Curtis A. Bradley, Customary

International Law and Private Rights of Action, 1 Chi J Intl L 421 (2000); Curtis A. Bradley &Jack L.
Goldsmith, III, The Current Illegitimacy of InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L Rev 319
(1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco, Plaintiffs' Diplomacy, 79 Foreign Aff 102 (Sept-Oct
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2000).
28 USC § 1350 (1994) (codifying the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat 73,77 (1789)).
This matter is controlled by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), Pub L No 94-583, 90
Star 2892 (1976), codified at 28 USC §§ 1330, 1332, 1602-1611 (1994 & Supp 1999).
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I. FALSE CONCERNS
One consistent strain of criticism of international human rights litigation is that

it divests foreign policy discretion from the elected, political branches of the
government and places it in the hands of an unbridled judiciary which is easily
manipulated by a cosmopolite, avaricious, and vaguely disloyal international law elite.
In support of the first part of this conspiracy narrative (the divestiture of foreign
policy power), critics adopt a primarily Hamiltonian idiom. As Professor Bradley
observes, "[t]he most significant cost of international human rights litigation is that it
shifts responsibility for official condemnation and sanction of foreign governments
away from elected political officials to private plaintiffs and their representatives.
Whether this is a good or bad development is something that I will consider below,
but the issue here is whether this characterization can really withstand dose scrutiny.
For critics of human rights advocacy in US courts, there is one very
uncomfortable reality: such litigation has been sanctioned by Congress and has met
with the general approval of every administration since that of Ronald Reagan. While
the original intent of the Alien Tort Statute may be shrouded in the mists of time, it is
neither fair nor accurate to characterize that provision of the First Judiciary Act of
1789 (which is so often regarded as a canonical document, like the Constitution itself,
the Bill of Rights and the Federalist Papers) as not "meaningful,"7 a mere historic
curiosity to be ignored at a whim. While it may indeed be impossible to conclusively
establish the contours of litigation originally contemplated under the ATS, it seems
beyond cavil that it was intended to provide some sort ofjudicial mechanism for the
adjudication, under expressly international law standards, of claims by foreigners.
Even more embarrassing for the coherence of the Hamiltonian opposition to
human rights advocacy was Congress's legislation of the Torture Victim Protection
Act ('T\VPA") in 1991-92.! Professor Bradley may well be correct in suggesting that
the TVPA was a narrowly-drawn statute, largely intended to extend to US citizens
the same relief offered by the ATS. Nothing on the face of the TVPA unsettles
6.
7.
8.

9.

Bradley, 2 ChiJ Ind L at 460 (cited in note 2).
Id at 462.
See, for example, Anne-Marie Burley, Te Alien Tort Statute and he JudciaryAct of 1789:. A Bzl: of
Honor, 83 Am J Ind L 461, 463 (1989) ('In the end, however, definitive proof of the intended
purpose and scope of the Alien Tort Statute is impossible.'); William R. Casto, e.: Federal Co'"
ProtectiveJurisdictionOver Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Conn L Rev 467, 48889 (1986) ("Notwithstanding frequent complaints about the obscurity of section 1350's origins, a
thorough study of available historical materials provides a fairly dear understanding of the sraures
purpose.'); William S. Dodge, The Historical Orins of thc Alien Tort Statute: A 1PkcTizn to &:
"Originalists, 19 Hastings Intl & Comp L Rev 221, 224 (1996); Jean-Maie Simon, T: Alim Tort
Claims ActrJustice or Show Trials, 11 BU Inl LJ 1, 8 (1993);Joseph Modeste Sweeney. A Tort Orl tn
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 Hastings Ind & Comp L Rev 445,446-47 (1995).
Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub L No 102-256, 106 Star 73 (1992), codified at 28 USC § 1350
note (1994).
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background rules of foreign sovereign immunity, or other principles of judicial
restraint. The TVPA certainly authorizes claims against private entities and thus
bears a Congressional imprimatur of this characteristic feature of private instance
litigation to vindicate human rights values." The TVPA is clearly a grant of a private
right of action to enforce international human rights law, even if that grant is limited
by exhaustion and state action requirements.
In this respect, the Hamiltonian critique of human rights advocacy is readily
apparent because the complaint is not that human rights litigation arrogates the
authority of the political branches and usurps Congress's authority as our nation's
law-maker. Rather, the underlying argument is really that private instance litigation
unsettles and embarrasses the freedom of the Executive Branch to conduct a
pragmatic, situational foreign policy free from the inconveniences of morality and
legality. Within this optic, the primary evil of human rights advocacy is that it
eschews pragmatism and realism, and constrains a utilitarian US foreign policy that
will often (although not invariably) prefer to subordinate human rights values to
power politics or economic demands.
I confess that aspects of this Hamiltonian pragmatism deeply resonate in my
own personal construct of an ideal of US foreign policy ideology. And it cannot be
doubted that some aspects of recent human rights litigation pose a direct challenge to
flexible and supple foreign policy approaches. The recent spate of Congressional
amendments to the FSIA, allowing for lawsuits to be brought against certain rogue
states and for the enforcement of judgments against such defendants," is particularly
mischievous and has drawn criticism from a wide variety of commentators. 2 But,
again, the irony is that the political branches of the government have sanctioned such
judicial mechanisms, and such initiatives have enjoyed wide bipartisan support. Why
shouldn't we be hard on state sponsors of terrorism, torture, murder, and religious
oppression?
And here we see a dramatic tension between the Hamiltonian
pragmatists who distrust judicial standards for evaluating the conduct of foreign
nations (such idealism gets in the way of business, after all), and the Jeffersonian and
10.

Section 2 of the TVPA provides:
ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ACTION.

(a) Liability. -An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to
the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death.
11.
12.

28 USC § 1350 note.
See 28 USC §§ 1605(a)(7), 1610(a)(7).
See, for example, Bradley, 2 Chi J Intl L at 463, n 25 (cited in note 2); Slaughter and Bosco, 79
Foreign Aff at 112-15 (cited in note 3).
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Jacksonian moralists and populists who are prepared to make a stand in defense of
principle.
But for other forms of Executive Branch prerogatives in foreign affairs there may
be less consensus to insulate them from judicial scrutiny. The recent ATS suits
against Li Peng 3 and Robert Mugabe 4 do appear to be cases-in-point for the foreign
policy pragmatists. But the confusion that exists with the nature and extent of headof-State immunity (as distinct from foreign sovereign immunity) may in large measure
be attributable to Congressional unwillingness alternatively to assimilate or
differentiate the two doctrines. The Executive Branch may nonetheless bejustified in
its insistence that it should be allowed to situationally determine when some sorts of
human rights cases against present or former heads-of-state should be allowed to
proceed.
One point is evident, however, and Professor Bradley makes it well:" as the US
allows suits in its courts against foreign sovereigns for human rights abuses, we can
expect retaliation by other nations. This has been a central dictate of US policy in
respect to foreign sovereign immunities and diplomatic privileges. While we may
morally desire to lash out at international malefactors, we cannot afford to give them a
pretext to manipulate existing international laws to their benefit. Our government
may deeply wish to prosecute drunken ambassadors who cause mayhem in our capital,
but we fret that our adversaries would delight in pretextual harassments of US
diplomats abroad. Indeed, this is a central dilemma of US compliance with
international law. When the US extends its jurisdiction to sanction a foreign
government's behavior, we like to think we are acting on principle; when a competitor
does so, we assume it is craven intimidation. This "shoe on the other foot" paradox
bespeaks the substantial surprise that is expressed when the US is haled before some
judicial process (international or domestic) as a defendant. But that cannot be held as
a reason to forego all stands on principle. In this respect, the Hamiltonian and
Jeffersonian critiques of human rights in US foreign policy will never be reconciled.
II. JUDICIAL RECTITUDE

A consistent theme of attack on international human rights advocacy has been
that artful litigators, bolstered by the siren-songs of international law academics, have
tricked otherwise sensible federal judges into unduly broadening the scope of the ATS
and to throw their usual judicial caution to the winds. It is an intriguing narrative,
true conspiratorial fare for American audiences weaned on legal obfuscation in THE

13.

Bao Ge v Li Peng, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12711 (DDC Aug 28,2000).

14.

See Bill Miller, MugabeSued in N.Y. Over Rijkts Abuses, Vash Post A3 (Sept 9,2000).

15.
16.

See, for example, Lafontant v Aristide, 844 F Supp 128 (EDNY 1994).
See Bradley, 2 ChiJ Ind L at 460-64 (cited in note 2).
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X-FILES"' or judicial misdeeds in THE STAR CHAMBER-'. There are only two
problems with this potential Hollywood script: the villains are miscast and the plot
rings false.
Environmental advocates may have Julia Roberts in ERIN BROCKOVICH'" as
their poster-child, but I am unaware of a comparable claim to fame by international
human rights lawyers. Nor can it be seriously suggested that international human
rights cases are going to overwhelm the dockets of the federal courts." International
human rights litigation is trivial when compared to employment cases, habeas
petitions, prisoner suits, and section 1983 actions. If there is a concern about
overworking our judicial public servants, or the propriety of offering state-subsidized
adjudication for certain matters, one might start with reform of these categories, or
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. Complaining that federal judges are being
swamped by international human rights litigation is like suggesting that we need to
abolish admiralty cases from federal jurisdiction.
As Professor Bradley seems to recognize, however, federal judges have not willynilly expanded the scope of the ATS and have used other procedural and prudential
doctrines to restrain such a tendency. This should come as no surprise. While the
language of the ATS is short and crisp-granting jurisdiction "of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States"-there is enough content to give federal judges a textual basis for
limiting the kinds of proceedings that can be brought within its terms. For starters,
and most importantly, courts have consistently construed the ATS as not creating any
new causes of action, but merely allowing the commencement of suits based on
existing common law grounds supported by customary international law or treaty."
The "tort only" phraseology has, as a consequence, excluded a number of causes of
action that sound in contract and has eliminated garden-variety commercial litigation
from the scope of the Act. 9

17.

18.

19.

In an admittedly imperfect empirical exercise, I calculate that since 1980 there have been
approximately ninety-five reported decisions involving a substantial issue implicating the ATS. (My
figure is drawn from Annotation, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute, (28 USCS § 1350),
Providingfor FederalJurisdictionOver Alien's Action for Tort Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or
Treaty of the United States, 116 ALR Fed 387 (1993) (updated through Oct 2000)). That makes for
slightly less than five cases a year. I recognize that this figure does not take into account unreported
decisions or orders, but nevertheless the magnitude of ATS cases is quite small.
See Goldstar (Panama) SA v United States, 967 F2d 965 (4th Cir 1992); In Re Estate of Marcos Human
Rights Litigation, 978 F2d 493 (9th Cir 1992). But see Xuncax v Gramajo, 886 F Supp 162, 179 (D
Mass 1995) ('§1350 yields both a jurisdictional grant and a private right to sue for tortious
violations of international law (or a treaty of the United States), without recourse to other law as a
source of the cause of action.").
See, for example, lIT v Vencap, Ltd, 519 F2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir 1975); Abiodun v Martin Oil Service,
Inc 475 F2d 142 (7th Cir 1973); Tamari v Bache & Co SAL, 730 F2d 1103, 1104 n 1 (7th Cir 1984);
Hamid v Price Waterhouse, 51 F3d 1411, 1417-18 (9th Cir 1995); De Wit v KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
NV, 570 F Supp 613,618 (SDNY 1983).
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The key limitation of the applicability of the ATS is whether certain conduct
will be deemed to constitute a violation of the law of nations or treaty of the United
States. The "treaty of the United States" language of the ATS is rarely mentioned by
the critics because it is undoubted that federal courts have the power under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause to enforce rights under treaties. Federal courts have
been careful' however, to limit the applicability of the ATS in such cases to rights
under treaties that are not only self-executing under the conventional doctrine, but
which also unambiguously
create private rights of action (which are not always the
21
same thing).
But the part of the ATS that draws the most criticism is the "law of nations"
phraseology that is correctly understood to refer to customary international law-the
general practices of nations as manifested by their conduct pursued out of a sense of
legal obligation. It is this element that such critics as Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith assume that federal courts will misjudge in their haste to pander to the
demands of human rights plaintiffs. But it just has not been so. Rather, courts have
vigorously applied a number of filters to preclude certain types of aggrieved conduct
from constituting a "violation of the law of nations" under the statute. A particular
manner of review-although one I do not necessarily agree vith-is formulated as
whether the conduct complained of is one presenting "extraordinary circumstances"
that not only violate international law or a treaty of the United States, but also are
"egregious violations of universally recognized principles of international law" as to
shock the conscience of the court.2 Courts have required that for conduct to violate
the norms of international law and thus be cognizable under the ATS it is required
that: (1) no state condones the act in question and there be a recognizable "universal"
consensus of prohibition against it;, (2) there are sufficient criteria to determine
whether a given action amounts to a prohibited act and violates the norm; and (3) the
prohibition against it is nonderogable and therefore binding at all times on all actors
Or, as one court has put it, the violation must be of an international norm that is
"specific, universal and obligatory."2

20.

See, for example, Dre)fus v'Von Finch 534 F2d 24, 30 (2d Cir 1976); FauldervJehnson, 178 F33 741,
742 (5th Cir 1999); Beanal v Freeport.McMoran,Inc, 197 3d 161, 164-68 (5th Cir 1999); Tdta D:
Panama, SA v United States Dept of Dtfense, 1992 US App LEXIS 18469, *15-19 (Fed Cir Aug 7,
1992) (unpublished opinion).

21.

See generally Carlos M. Vizquez The Four Doctrines of Sel.Executing Treaties, 89 Am J Intl L 695
(1995).

22.
23.

See Zapata v Quinn,707 P2d 691 (2d Cir 1983); Beanal, 197 P3 at 167.
See Xuncax, 886 F Supp at 187 ("[T]he requirement of universality goes not only to recognition of
the norm in the abstract sense, but to agreement upon its content as well; ee alsojrns t Paty Ray

Geophysical Geosource, Inc, 722 F Supp 343, 348 (SD Tex 1989), afrd on other grounds, 954 F2d 1061
24.

(5th Cir 1989).
In re Estate of FerdinandMarcos Human Rights Lit, 25 F3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir 1994); see also Eastman
Kodak Co v Kavlin, 978 F Supp 1078,1091 (SD Fla 1997).
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Notwithstanding these essential limiting factors on ATS litigation, it has been
suggested that recent developments in the case law have vastly expanded human rights
litigation in US courts. Chief among these have been the Second Circuit's ruling in
Kadic v Karad&i, 25 which held that the 'law of nations," as understood in the modern
era for purposes of actions brought under the ATS, was not confined in its reach to
state action, and that certain forms of conduct, such as piracy, slave trade, and war
crimes, violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under auspices
of the State or only as private individuals. But by its own terms, this is an exceedingly
narrow ruling, subjecting private actors only to a handful of offenses that can truly be
characterized as implicating either universal jurisdiction or jus cogens norms. In a
similar vein, the recent rulings in Doe v Unocal Corpj and Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co27 may subject private business actors to liability under the ATS, but only where
they collude as a matter of state action with sovereign authorities that are engaged in
particularly heinous conduct, such as genocide or murder. The level of proof that
would be required to demonstrate such complicity-where a transnational
corporation was literally the surrogate for state action-will be high, indeed. To date,
no such suit has prevailed on the merits. Lastly, some cases have suggested that the
US government can be a proper defendant in a case brought under the ATS, provided
that some other statutory waiver of sovereign immunity can be satisfied.'
Professor Bradley makes the point that as human rights litigation expands, there
will be an equal and opposite tendency for courts to use procedural and prudential
doctrines to restrain it. He further observes that such a backlash may distort and
confuse the application of such doctrines as foreign sovereign immunity, forum non
conveniens, personal jurisdiction, acts of state and political questions. I share this
concern and predicted it nearly six years ago.' And while I have been critical of the
use of doctrines that allow courts to avoid the merits of cases because of perceived
political sensitivities, I can certainly credit the concern that if US courts are to issue
judgments that will be regarded as legitimate in these controversies, elemental notions
of jurisdiction and appropriateness of venue should be satisfied. But rather than
vindicating criticism of human rights litigation, the fact that virtually no ATS cases
have been dismissed on forum non conveniens or personal jurisdictional grounds is
indicative that advocacy in this area has not exceeded the accepted bounds ofjudicial
propriety.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

Kadic v KaradVi6, 70 F3d 232,239 (2d Cir 1995).
110 F Supp 2d 1294, 1305 (CD Cal 2000).
226 F3d 88, 104 (2d Cir 2000).
See Alvarez-Macbain v United States, 107 F3d 696, 702-03 (9th Cir 1996). Indeed, allowing for suits
against the US government (or states and other political subdivisions) may have been within the
original conception of the statute, especially in granting a remedy for unlawful captures at sea. See
sources cited in note 8.
See Bederman, DeadMan's Hand,25 GaJ Intl & Comp Law at 276-79 (cited in note 3).
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III. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
So the conspiracy narrative of hapless federal judges succumbing to the
imporrunings of human rights litigators is simply not credible. Nor is the villain
portrayed by the critics-the cosmopolite international law professor-likely to be
very believable. Although I can certainly agree with Professor Bradley that
international law academics have played a role as human rights advocates out of a
sense of professional aspiration,30 I am less certain how much impact this has had on
actual court decisions. Despite the flurry of amicus briefs in human rights cases (some
of which I have even authored or subscribed to), and the tome-like affidavits on
international law, judges tend to rely on the traditional and recognized sources of
international legal obligation: treaty texts and dearly documented evidence of state
practice. In their criticism of our overweening influence, Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith simply give international law academics too much credit.
But I worry that there might be something else afoot in the critique of academic
international lawyers and human rights advocacy, and this brings me to the theme
introduced in the opening of this essay. In this criticism there is a whiff ofa suggestion
that international law academics are an elite, manipulating US foreign policy for their
own self-aggrandizing ends. Professor Bradley writes that we should question the
ability of academics "to nearly separate their scholarly and advocacy roles.' Worse
yet, the implication is that the participation of academics in this process of advocacy is
undemocratic, and, perhaps, even a bit un-American.*:
Here we have an unalloyed Jacksonian vision of American foreign policy:
populist, intensely skeptical of international law, and deeply distrustful of policy-

making elites. Indeed, as Walter Russell Mead recently observed, "of all the major
currents in American society, Jacksonians have the least regard for international law
and international institutions."' That may well be true, and critics of human rights
litigation may have some substantial justifications for concern. But lack of democracy
and popular accountability is not one of them.
If anything, human rights advocacy and the direct use of courts to vindicate the
honor and dignity of individuals may be more consistent with aJacksonian ideal than
one might at first suppose. For starters, the decentralization of initiative that is evident
in human rights litigation marks a clear departure from the classic model of
diplomatic protection by way ofgovernment espousal of claims. No longer should the
pursuit of justice in such cases be the captive of political and diplomatic expediency.
30.

See Bradley, 2 Chi J Ind L at 467-68 (cited in note 2). See also my obsernanons m Dawd J.
Bederman, I Hate InternationalLaw Scholarship(Sort OJ), 1 Chi J Ind L 75 (200).

31.
32.

Bradley, 2 ChiJ Int L at 468 (cited innote 2).
See id ("[T]hese academic experts have even less democratic aecountability than the fderal judges
themsdves.).

33.

See Mead, Nad Interest at 18 (cited in note 1).
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In this respect, human rights advocacy is a partial antidote to the strong US foreign
policy tradition of pragmatism and utilitarianism. Individual grievances have tended
to be subordinated to the greater good of the nation in its pursuit of common foreign
policy objectives. The Jacksonian emphasis on the vindication of honor, irrespective
of the desires of the Hamiltonian foreign policy and commercial establishment, offers
a slight change of emphasis by sanctioning a direct form of action based on principle,
not expediency.
The ultimate proof that human rights litigation is consistent with a Jacksonian
vision of foreign policy is the extent to which such advocacy enjoys substantial grassroots public support. The public actually has taken note of this development-and
they approve. This is not only manifested, as I have suggested before, in the strong
bipartisan support in Congress for the TVPA and anti-terrorism amendments to the
FSIA, but also in public opinion polling. 4
The populist, Jacksonian critique of international human rights advocacy is thus
simply a convenient rhetorical cover. It is the brainchild of another, competing foreign
policy elite, dismayed at the inroads of the Wilsonian and Jeffersonian legalists and
idealists on commercialist pragmatism and Executive Branch prerogative. The
standard critique of human rights advocacy cannot possibly reconcile its Hamiltonian
and Jacksonian strands-not that it needs to. Contradiction and conflict has been a
hallmark in US foreign policy-making, and attitudes about international human rights
advocacy should be no exception.

34.

For the results of a systematic set of polling data, see Program on International Policy Attitudes

(PIPA), Americans on Globalization:A Study of US Public Attitudes (PIPA 2000), available online at
<http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Globalization/contents.html> (visited Sept 30, 2001).
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